Recent Developments in Extradition: Interstate Co-Operation and Individual Rights in Extradition Law: Can the Two Exist by Williams, Sharon A.
Osgoode Hall Law School of York University
Osgoode Digital Commons
Articles & Book Chapters Faculty Scholarship
1993
Recent Developments in Extradition: Interstate
Co-Operation and Individual Rights in Extradition
Law: Can the Two Exist
Sharon A. Williams
Osgoode Hall Law School of York University, sawilliams@osgoode.yorku.ca
Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.osgoode.yorku.ca/scholarly_works
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial-No Derivative Works
4.0 License.
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Scholarship at Osgoode Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Articles & Book Chapters by an authorized administrator of Osgoode Digital Commons.
Recommended Citation
Williams, Sharon A. "Recent Developments in Extradition: Interstate Co-Operation and Individual Rights in Extradition Law: Can the
Two Exist." Hague Yearbook of International Law 6 (1993): 95-106.
RECENr DEVELOPMENTS IN EXTRADmON 
INTERSTATE CO-OPERATION AND INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS IN 
EXTRADmON LAW: CAN THE TWO EXIST?* 
by 
Sharon A •. Williams•• 
1. Introduction 
Extradition may be defined as the complex compendium of rules and procedures 
that enable states to seek the return of fugitives from their criminal justice sys-
tems. In this sense extradition is a pan of the system of mutual assistance in 
criminal matters between states. The essential element here is reciprocity, with 
states having a mutuality of obligations. 1 However, at the same time, extradition 
performs the important function of providing the individual fugitive with pro-
tection through legal safeguards, that may prevent return to the state making the 
extradition request. 
Initially, the emphasis of extradition law was on the obligations owed by one 
state to anoth.er state and the fugitive under consideration had only the rights and 
procedural safeguards granted to her or him as an object of the process. The sole 
recourse that the fugitive had was to the extradition treaty and the domestic law 
of the requested state. It is evident that here there were potentially two conflicting 
pulls in opposite directions: the international co-operative approach, bearing on 
the rights and duties of states and the domestic law perspective with an increasing 
emphasis on the protection of a fugitive's rights. 
Case law in many states including Canada, the United Kingdom and the 
United States shows a favour for liberal interpretation of treaties in order to give 
effect to them. This bas been viewed as in keeping with the commitment to inter-
pret them in good faith, as dictated by the maxim pacta sunt servanda. In a 1987 
decision of the Supreme Coun of Canada in Canada v. Schmidt, it was held 
that2 : 
• 
"The prcscm syslcm of extradition works bce<1usc couru give the treaties a fair and 
liberal interpretation with a view 10 fulfilling Canada's obligations, reducing the 
Paper prcsenced at the Conference Commemorating lhe 701h Anniversary of lhe AAA held at 
The Hague, 19·21 July 1993. 
•• F.R.S.C .. LL.B .. LL.M .. D.Jur .. Professor of lntc:mationaJ Law and International Criminal 
Law, Osgoode Hall Law School, York University, Toronto, Canada. 
1. As1orcciprocityseeM.C. Bassiouni , lntcmationalExtradition: United Slates lawand Practice, 
Vol. I (2nd ed .. 1987), p. 325 and International Extradition and World Public Order (1974). 
pp. 314-315. 
2. (1987) I S.C.R. 500. 524 (per La Fores! .I .). 
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tcchnicalilies of criminal law to a minimum and uusting the courts in the foreign 
country to give the fugitive a fair trial." 
In Belgium v. Pos1le1hwai1e3. the House of Lords reasoned in 1988 that states 
have entered into extradition treaties in order to bring to justice those who have 
committed grave crimes and that to apply to th.em strict canons of statutory inter-
pretation appropriate to construing domestic legislation would tend to defeat 
rather than serve the purpose. 
The purpose of this aniclc is to address in general terms whether the tra-
ditional safeguards for the fugitive arc either needed or warranted today given 
the increased injection of international human rights law into the process, as well 
as increasing reliance on constitutional norms in some stares. The argument is 
that in an age of increased co-operation in international criminal matters, with 
a determined cffon being made by many states to deter and if thls fails to extra-
dite or prosecute international and transnational criminal offenders, obstacles that 
arc concerned with essentially conceptions of state sovereignly can be done away 
with as long as basic human rights and fundamental freedoms arc guaranteed. 
This anicle will consider two of lhc grounds for refusal and consider their 
future place in extradition law and practice. The experience of Canada, a state 
that does not belong to a cohesive regional system, such as the CouOOJ of Europe, 
with strong transnational human rights protections and close international criminal 
co-operation will be the focus. Unlike the siruation in states panics to the Euro-
pean Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Frccdoms4 , any transgres-
sion by Canada of internationally recognized human rights cannot be appealed 
to a regional adjudicative body with enforcement powers such as the European 
Coun of Human Rights in Strasbourg. Nevenheless, it must be noted that the 
1982 Canadian Constitution Act5 is modelled in many respects on the European 
Convention on Human Rights, as well as the lntcrnational Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights. 6 
2. Grounds for refusal 
2.1. Nationality of the fugitive 
Broadly speaking. when a state enters into an extradition treaiy relationship with 
another state based on rcciproci1y, it seems to imply an understanding that the 
panics view as more or less equivalent their respective conceptions of the fun-
damentals of criminal justice. On this basis. is it in keeping with this perceived 
3. (1987), A.C. 924. This case wucitcd by the Judicial Commlttccoflhc Privy Council in United 
Sraus v. Bowt! (1990). A.C. SOO (On appeal from Bahamas). 
4. 19SO ETS No. S. 
S. Pan I of the 1982 Const.itution Act. 
6. 999 UNTS, p. 171. 
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mutual confidence and respect, for the requested state to refuse to extradite ilS 
own citizens and nationals, on th.e one hand, but to be amenable to surrender non-
citizcn permanent residenlS or other aliens on the other? If the criminal law safe-
guards al trial and other guarantees for the fair trial of the fugitive, once extra-
dited arc more or less equivalent in both states, then should not extradition of 
all offenders be viewed in the same way and permitted? 
Space does not permit an account of the history of this ex.ception to extradi-
tion in civil law countries and the contrary position taken by common law juris-
dictions. However, a few brief remarks arc necessary, on what Lord Cockburn 
in 1877 called a ~blot on the law". 7 A year later in 1878 be chaired a royal com-
mission in Great Britain 10 look at the state of extradition law. Four traditional 
arguments were identified for non~xtradition of nationals. Firstly, the fugitive 
should not be withdrawn from bis natural judges. Secondly, the state owes to 
its subjects the protection of its laws. Thirdly, it is not possible to have complete 
confidence in the justice meted out in a foreign state, especially with regard 10 
a foreigner and founhly, it is not advantageous to the accused to be tried in a 
foreign language, separated from family, friends, resources and character 
witnesses. 8 
II must be recalled that if the common law countries that at that time and 
still today use the territorial basis of jurisdiction over the offence as their prim-
ary basis were to refuse extradition of citizens, alleged and convicted fugitive 
offenders would avoid prosecution or punishment. The common law approach 
has thus been that where an extradition treaty is silent as to nationality or citizen-
ship it applies to all persons. The British courts, like the Cockburn Commission 
have refused to accept the view that the non~tradition of citizcns or nationals 
is a rule of customary international law and should be implied into the extradition 
treaty. 
The majority of Canada's extradition treaties that specify nationality or citizen-
ship state that the parties arc not obliged to extradite such persons, giving a 
discretion to the requested state. 9 Of special interest here is the 1989 Treaty 
between Canada and the Netherlands that talces a different tack and perhaps is 
indicative of future developments on th.is issue. Article 3(1) provides that a re-
quest for extradition "shall not be refused solely on the basis of the national-
ity of the person sought" . 10 In those treaties where a discretion is present, from 
the Canadian perspective it is a policy maner for the executive, namely, the 
Minister of Justice. This is also the case with the political offence exception11 
7. R. v. Wilson , 11877] 3 Q. B. 42. 44. 
8. Royal Commission on Exrraditlon. Repon or the Commissioners (1878), Cmd. 2039, 908. 
9. Sec, ~.g .. Eli1radition Treaty between Caiuda and Mexico, Can. T.S. 1990, No. 35, Anlcle 
3(1); Exr.nditioo Treaty between Canada and France. Can. T .S . 1989, No. 38, Ankle 3(1 ). 
10. Extradition Treaty between Camda and the Netherlands, Can. T.S. No. 32, Ankle 3(1 ). 
11. Extradition Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. E-23, s. 22. Sec Wisconsin v. Armstrong, (1973) 30 D.l..R. 
3d 727. 
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and the death scnrence exception. 12 It should, however, be sttcssed that should the 
treaty obligation, the section of the EJttradition Act or the exercise of the 
Minister's discretion violate a right of the fugitive contained in the Canadian 
Charter of Rights and Freedoms, which is an integral part of the Canadian Con-
stitution Act of 198213, then the provisions of the Charter of Rights will have 
primacy. As was stated by the Supreme Court of Canada in Canada v. SchmidJ14 
"There can be no doubt that the actions undertaken by the Government of Canada 
in extradition as in other maners arc subject to scrutiny under the Charter ... • 
On the other hand, many civil law stateS have been uncompromising on this 
issue. Apart from the reasons outlined in the Cockburn Commission, the only 
rationale for non-extradition is that any detrimental impact is tempered by the 
domestic provision for prosecution on the nationality basis of jurisdiction over 
the criminal offence. It is submitted that if the requesting state cannot be trusted 
to act fairly, then no extradition shou.ld take place regardless of nationality. On 
this point it has been stated that15 
"(l)f a state owes to its nationals a duiy to apply its own laws 10 them as to acts, 
wherever committed by them. then it should demand extradition of nationals who 
have committed acts abroad and have been taken into cus1ody there. In facl, in the 
latter siruacion, the stale of allegiance contents itself with watching 10 sec tha.t its 
nationals obtain justice. The same protection of nationals should suffice after 
extradition." 
Even where the requested state docs have the jurisdiction to prosecute itself based 
on nationality, the accused is in a privileged position, because the stale of nation-
ality may have no real interest in prosecuting for an offence committed abroad, 
where the victims likely are foreigners. with remote sources of evidence and also 
a general lack of contact with the crime. l6 
In Canada, until the enacunent in 1982 of the Canadian Charter of Rights 
and Freedoms. Canadian citizens had been extradited either where the extradition 
treaty was silent on the nationality question or where a d.iscretion existed and 
was exercised by the Minister of Justice in favour of extradition. Section 6( I) 
of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms provides that every Canadian 
citizen has the right "to enter, remain in and leave Canada". In this context the 
issue is what is meant by the word "remain". Without going into the intricacies 
12. Extradition Act. id .• s. 1S. Sec funher Sharon A. Williams, Extradition 10 a Sttlc tha1 lmposcs 
Ille Oealh Penalty. 2 CY!L 1990. pp. 117. 138-141. 
13. Op. cit. supra n. S. 
14. Op. cit. supra n. 2. p. SIS ~r l:l Forest J.). referring 10 Opuation DisntlUllle Inc. v. R .. 
(198S) I S.C.R. 441, 4SS , 464. 
IS. Oran Convention on Extradition wilh Commcn1. 29 Al!L 1935, pp. IS. 128. 
16. See S.A. WilJW!u. Human Rights Safeguards and tn1cma1ional Co-oper:uion in Bxtndi1ion: 
S1riking Ille Balance. 3 Criminal Law Forum 1m, pp. 191. 203. 
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of the Canadian Chancr and especially the limiting Section I , it is sufficient here 
to look to the cases on point which go to the hean of the matter. 
In Federal Republic of Gennany v. Rauca11, Helmut Rauea was charged 
in the Federal Republic of Gennany with mass murder in Lithuania during the 
Second World War, during its occupation and de/aero control by Germany. At 
the time be was a German citizen and member of the Gestapo. rn the 1950s be 
had gained entrance to Canada and ev·entually had become a Canadian citizen. 
When this request was presented Canada had not enacted the amendments to its 
Criminal Code that have been in place since August I 987 which would allow 
for prosecution in Canada of such a case, on the basis here of the presence of 
the accused today in Canada, even though it is the onJy connecting element. It 
was argued on the fugitive's behalf that onJy extradition should be ru.led out 
because of the right of the Canadian citizen to remain in Canada. II was held that 
even though the right to remain is prima facie violated by extradition, the right 
to remain is not absolute and extradition is •a reasonable limit prescribed by law 
as can be demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society~. Two more 
recent cases have presented a Section 6( I) right to remain argument, but with 
the vital fact difference that rather than be extradited they could in fact in theory 
have been prosecuted in Canada for the sam.e criminal conduct because aa signif-
icant portion of the activities took place in Canada" .18 Their argument was 
based on the facts that their personal conduct had occurred entirely in Canada 
and that the.re was concurrent jurisdiction in Canada and the United States. In 
dea.ling with this contention that because prosecucion was possible that extradition 
was unconstitutional in the cases of United States v. Cotronit9 and United States 
v. El 7.ein2° the Supreme Coun of Canada held that extradition was essential 
to the continuance of a stable and democratic society and that the objectives of 
extradition warranted the limited interference with the right to remain in Canada. 
Specifically, the Supreme Coun stated that in a number of cases Canada had 
recognized that the United States as the requesting state had jurisdiction over the 
offence and the ability to request extradition from Canada successfully where 
the fugitive's acts were confined to Canadian territory, but detrimenta.I effeccs 
were felt in the United States.2 t Also, the Coun held that it may in some cases 
be preferable for the accused to be tried in the foreign state. 22 Such a decision 
must be based on the prosecutorial discretion of the requested state, whilst giving 
due regard to individual constitutional rights. ln Canada, as in many countries, 
prosecutorial d.iscretion bas been viewed as both necessary and desirable and the 
courts have been reluctant to review such a power. The key seems to have been 
17. (1983). 41 O.R. (2d). 225 (Ont . C.A.) . 
18. The ICSI laid OUI in Ubman v. R .. [198S] 2 S .C.R. 178, 212 (S.C.C.). 
19. (19891 1 S.C.R. 1469 (S.C.C.). 
20. Id. 
21. Id .. 1488. 
22. Id. 
100 S.A. WILLIAMS 
that the criminal justice system best operates through a broad grant of prosccu-
torial discretion and that there may be very valid reasons why the decision is 
made to extradite rather than to prosecute. Unless there is an abuse of process, 
in that the discretion were exercised in an improper or arbitrary way23, the de-
cision should not be interfered with by the couns. The prosccutorial authorities 
have the obligation to make sure that prosecution in Canada is not a realistic 
option.24 
ln conclusion, Canadian courts view extradition, even where prosecution 
in Canada is possible on the same facts as a reasonable limitation on the right 
of a Canadian to remain in Canada, especially where the objective is the effec-
tive prosecution of international ,:rime. Thus, it bas been possible to reconcile 
the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms and Canada's extradition treaty 
obligations. 
2.2. The double criminality rule 
It is a basic precept of extradition law, contained in many states' domestic legis-
lation as well as bilateral extradition treaties, that the double criminality rule bas 
a central role to play. The rule provides that the offence for which the fugitive 
is sought must, on the basis of reciprocity, be one for which the requested stare 
could in tum rcqucsr extradition. It relates to the maxim nu/la poena sine lege, 
or no punishment without law. As Oppenheim succinctly stated: •No person may 
be extradited whose deed is not a crime according to the criminal law of the swe 
which is asked to extradite as well as the state which demands extradition. "15 
Nevertheless, it is not viewed as a principle of customary international law, but 
rather as a creature of treaty and statute. 2AI Thus, the fugitive cannot raise it 
as a ground for refusal if it is not provided for in the governing treaty . This 
position bas recent!~ been reinforced by the Supreme Coun of Canada in United 
States v. McVey II 7, where it was held that there is no obligation under cus-
tomary international law or the common law; that treaties create the obligation 
to do so and that the parameters of the obligations must be found within the four 
comers of the treaties. As noted in another decision of the same court in Allard 
v. Chare11e28, the practice of states may have a value in inte.rprcting the law 
23. Sec R. v . &Jut. 119881 2 S.C.R. 387. 411 (S.C.C.). Nocc Unittd Starts v. laquinto, No. 
3S6/91 (Ont. C.A •. 23 July 1991, unreponcd). 
24. Id •• 1498. 
2.5. L. Oppenheim. International Law (8th ed •• 195.S). p. 701 . 
26. Sec Factor v. Loubtnhtlmer. 290 US, 276 (1923). 
27. 119921 3 S.C.R. 4S7. Hereinafter "McVey //". 
28. (19911 I S.C.R 861, 86.S. Sec also R. v. Parisitn, 1198811 S.C.R. 950. Note the contrary 
position taken by I. Shearer, Extradition in International Law (1971), p. 138. However. this 
does not seem w gel with acrual practice. 
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but when it comes down to extradition it is the terms of the treaty that must be 
looked at and that is where the international duty lies. 
The approach ta.ken by Canada over the last five years or so bas been to 
adopt lhe so-called "no-list" approach in new or amended extradition treatics.29 
This means that there is not a list of extraditable crimes appended to the panicular 
treaty and the emphasis is on double criminality and duality of punishability. 30 
This appears to be the way of the future, as it prevents the problems of out-dated 
lists and allows for potentially more offences to be extraditable such as fiscal 
offences, that for the most part are not extraditable under list trcaties. 31 Never-
theless, it is still the requirement, and in these no-list treaties perforce the central 
requirement, that the offence is regarded as criminal in both the requesting and 
requested states. The emphasis is not on the strict denomination of the offence 
in the respective states but rather upon the conduct constituting the offence. 
However. in those treaties which still maintain the appended list of extradit-
able offences, the position bas long been taken by Canadian courts that it is not 
necessary for Canada and the requesting state to use the same terminology or 
denomination. The key factor bas been that the fugitive bas committed what 
amounts to a criminal offence in both states and that a prima facit case bas been 
established. In Co1roni v. Attorney Gtntral of Camida32, the Supreme Coun 
of Canada held that the test to be used is what is the essence of the offence. 
There is no requirement of exact identity between the offence that the fugitive 
is charged with in the requesting state and the Canadian offence. The emphasis 
is on the criminal conduct, the inquiry is not focussed on the legal framework 
of the requesting state, but rather on the facts and whether they can be fitted into 
Canadian criminal law in order to establish that if the conduct had occurred in 
Canada. it would have amou.nted to a criminal offence in that country. 
The issue of double criminaliir came before the Supreme Coun of Canada 
again in Washington v. Johnson3 , where the applicable treaty was the 1971 
29. Stt, t .g .. lhe Exindilion TrC2ties betWttn Caiuda and Franu, Can. T .S. t989, No. 36; 
Can.Mia and lhe Nclhcrlands. Can. T .S. t99t. No. 32: Canada and India. Can. T .S. 1987. No. 
14 and Canada and lhc United Sta~ of America. Can. T.S. 1976. No. 3. as amended by 
Protocol. Can. T .S. 1991. No. 37. 
30. Bassiouni. op. cit. supra n. I. p. 322. Note !hat there bu been a considerable debate over the 
ycan u to the two potential ways to interpret double criminality. There is the in con.crtto, or 
objective approach that loolr.s to tbc euct labelling of the offence and its constitucnl clements. 
See 41 RIDP 1970, p. 12 for resolutions adopccd by the 1969 Congress of tbe Jruemational 
Assoclarion of Penal Law, which demonslr.ltcs a preference for this approach. On the other 
band there is the in obstrocto, or subjective approach that looks to the acrual criminal nature 
of the act without und.uc ""'ight on the label and full identity of the elements in the states. See 
C. van den Winaacn. Double Criminality as a Requirement to Jurisdicrion, in: N. Jareborg 
(ed .). Double Criminality Studies in lntemarional Law (1989), p. 43. 
31. Note, however. that the Cllccption for fiical offences even In list treaties was eroded in the 
House of Lords decision in R. v. Oiltf Mtrropollton Mag/strait, u pone Stcrttory of Stole 
for the Home /)qHutmmt, (19881 I WLR 1204 (H.L.). 
32. (197611 S.C .R. 219. Sec :Wo Unlrtd Stotts v. Smith. (1984) 15 C.C.C. 3d 16. 
33. 11988140 c.c.c. 3d 548. 
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Extradition Treaty between Canada and the United States. 34 This treaty con-
tained a schedule of offences. In writing for the majority Justice Wilson stated 
that the issue was whether the requesting state must establish that the offence 
charged in the requesting state is an offencc in Canada, or whether it was enough 
to show that the conduct that the fugitive was charged with would have amounted 
to a crime, I.isled in the treaty, if it had taken place in Canada. As in the earli.er 
cases the coun held that there is no need for exact identity in terminology used 
10 denominate the offence, nor for the elements of the crime to be the same in 
both states. 3s As a practical matter this would be an impossible task to accom-
plish, even as in this case in two common law systems with fairly similar criminal 
systems.36 Most recently, the Supreme Court of Canada in McVey 1137, pres-
ented the Canadian approach, when the majority noted that in Canada the practice 
had developed of giving th.e extradition judge the role of identifying the crime 
for which the fugitive was charged according to Canadian law. The.refore, the 
crime as it is known in the requesting state is set out in the information and the 
arrest warrant and the extradition judge identifies the equivalent Canadian crime. 
This being said, there was until the Supreme Court decision in McVey n 38 
some controversy in Canadian jurisprudence as 10 whether the crime had to be 
listed in the schedule or list appended to the treaty in the names under which it 
is known in the requesting state and Canada. lo simple terms was a double listing 
necessary? This restrictive approach was taken bl'oJustice Borins in United States 
v. Smith39, and by Justice Wilson in Johnson. Both relied on the following 
passage from La Forest's Extradition to and from Canada41 : 
•An ciuradition crime may be broadly defined as an act of which a person is accused. 
or has been convicted of having committed within the jurisdiction of one state. that 
constitutes a crime in that state and in the state where that person is found, and that 
is mentioned or described in an extradition treaty between those states under a name 
or description by which it is known in each state." 
An opposite view was taken by Justice Smith, the extradition judge in Unitt!d StaJes 
v. Caro-Payan42 and UniJt!d StaJes v. Golirsdiek.43 She emphasiud that "a treaty 
34. Entered into force in 1976. Can. T.S. 1976. No. 3; 27 U.S.T . • p. 983. 
3S. Op. cit. supra n. 34. p. SS3. 
36. See H.V.E. Hanley Booth. British Extradition Law and Procedure (1980). p. SO. where he 
states that !be extradition court cannot become • tribunal of foreign law. 
37. Op. cit. supra n. 2, at p. Sl2. 
38. Id. 
39. Op. rit. supra n. 32. at p. 28. 
40. Op. cit. supra n. 33. 
41. G.V. La f-orcst. Extradition to and from Canada (2nd ed .. 1977), p. 42. 
42. Ont. D.C .• 18 February 1988. unreported. 
43. Ont . D.C .• Janu.iry 1986. unreported . 
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must be [given] a liberal interpretation m working to achieve its stated ends~ .44 
She applied the British cases of In re Neilson.u and United States v. McCaffery"6 
and went on to hold that the old double criminality test, which required an almost 
exact pairing of all of the constituent c·lements, is not the requisite test today. 
Rather, it is the conduc1 test tha1 should be applied. The Caro-Payan decision 
with respect to there being no need for an exact pairing of the constituent elements 
is non-controversial. However, it is the underlying rationale of th.e decision that 
is pe.rtinent to this discussion, in that Justice Smith seems to have had the opinion 
that as long as the conduct would be criminal if committed in Canada, and if that 
conduct is listed in the treaty, then there is no need for it also to be listed under 
a name by which it is known in the requesting state. This would seem to go 
against the position taken in the La Forest text, that there would have to be a 
double listing in the treaty schedule. As this writer has commented elsewhere. 
however much assistance a doctrinal view may be it does not bind the courts. 47 
There is a good argument that Article 2(1) of the 1971 Canada-United States 
Extradition Treaty does not require such double listing. The McVey II case has 
cleared up this quandary as to single or double listing. This case involved an 
extradition reques1 for the offence of conspiracy to export high-technology equip-
ment to the former USSR and ten counts of malcing false statements to the United 
States Customs service to put such export into effect. The 1971 Treaty did not 
list the making of false statements as an extraditable offence. However, the extra-
dition judge held that he could commit the fugitive for surrender because firstly, 
the conduct of the fugitive would have constituted the crime of forgery if done 
in Canada48• and secondly because forgery was listed in the 1971 Treaty. It 
must be not.ed that McVey's conduct did not amount to forgery in the United 
States. The argument presented by the fugitive that a double listing was required 
was rejected. This decision was reversed on habeas corpus and upheld on appeal 
to the British Columbia Court of Appea149, where the Court interpreted the 
Johnson case to require double listing. The passage in the La Forest text quoted 
above was referred to again. 
None of the earlier cases had direct bearing factually on the Mc Vey Tl case. 
The Smith case had dealt with a request for murder where the conduct would have 
been c.lassified as manslaughter in Canada. However, both offences were listed 
in the 1971 Canada-United States Treaty. In Johnson, the concern of the Supreme 
Court of Canada was with whether the crime for which the fugitive was sought 
would be a crime contained in the treaty list by a name known under the criminal 
44. Caro-Payan, op. cit. supra n. 42. 
4S. [19841 2 All E.R . 84 (H .L.). 
46. (19841 2 AU E.R . 570 (H .L.). 
47. S.A. Williams, The Double Criminality Ruic and Extradition: A Comparative Analysis, IS 
Nova LR 1991. pp. 82, 608 and S.A. Williams. The Double Criminality Ruic Revisited. 27 
Israel LR 1993, pp. I. 7. 
48. Sec the Criminal Code of Canada. R.S.C . 1985 c. C.46. ss . 366 and 321. 
49. [1989) 33 B.C.l.R. 2d 28. 
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law of Canada. The difficult question is to decide what construction must be 
placed upon Article 2(1) of the 1971 Treaty which provides that: 
"Persons shall be delivered up according to the provisions of this Treaty for any of 
lhe offences listed in lhe Schedule annexed to this Treaty, which is an integral part 
of this Treaty, provided lhat these offences are punishable by the laws of both Con-
tracting Parties by a term of imprisonment exceeding one year.· 
When the wording is examined carefully, ii is apparent that the article can be 
divided into two parts. Firstly, the person shall be exttadited according to the 
provisions of the treaty for any of the offences listed in the Schedule and second-
ly, that the Listed offences must be punishable by the laws of both stales by a term 
of imprisonment of not less than one year. As discussed above, it is the duality 
of conceptions of the criminality of the conduct that is the keynote. The intention 
of the parties to the treaty was to cxttadite on the basis of reciprocity and the 
second part of Anicle 2( I) should be read in this light. The term "offences" 
should be interpreted to mean "conduct" and any "conduct" listed in th.e treaty 
should be extraditable, provided that it meets the two part test contained therein. 
The principle of speciality is also of interest here. It provides that a person 
shall not be tried or punished in the re'!l:csting stale for an offence other than 
that for which extradition was granted. It is linked to the rigid approach of 
noo-cxttadition exhibited by the Court of Appeal in Mc Vey II. However, if a rigid 
technical interpretation is made of Article 2(1) of the 1971 Treaty, it would result 
i.n unnecessary difficulties concerning criminal conduct. The British Columbia 
Coun of Appeal held that as McVey's conduct would not amount to forgery 
under the US Code and other legislation, this would result in a violation of the 
specialty principle. Sl This analysis seems artificial and would defeat the purpose 
of the treaty, which is based on the reciprocal recognition by both states of the 
criminality of the conduct. Unrelated offences allegedly commined before extra 
The Supreme Coun of Canada n.oted in McVey II that the Coun of Appeal 
considered itself bound by the Johnson precedent, although the facts as conceded 
by the laner coun were the reverse. lo Johnson the issue had been whether the 
requesting state bad to establish that the crime would constitute one listed in the 
schedule according to the law of Canada. The majority found that in coming t.o 
its decision the Court of Appeal in McVey bad been affected by the quotation 
from the La Forest text quoted above. 52 Most imponantly, Justice La Forest 
writing for the majority and author of the said book noted that the definition in 
a book is not a substitute for the extradition legislation, and it may be added the 
treaty itself. He stated that the quoted passage was meant to be "broad description 
viewed from the perspective of the whole of the extradition process~ and not to 
SO. See, t.g., Ankle XJJ of the 1971 Canada·United Stites fa1radition Treaty. 
SI. 11988) 30 B.C.L.R. 2d 197. 
S2. Op. cit. supra n. 41. 
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be used in place of the legislation itself. Therefore, he dispatched with the re-
quirement for a double listing. · 
In conclusion, the McVey 11 Coun held that what must be established i.s that 
the conduct of the fugitive would, if it had occurred in Canada constitute a crime 
listed in the treaty according to some name by which it is known under Canadian 
criminal law. This decision is to be applauded. Even though the 1991 Protocol53 
to the 1971 Canada-United States Treaty has adopted the no-list approach and 
now applies to all extradition requests berween Canada and the United States 
made after its entry into force, even where the criminal conduct took place prior 
to that date, the decision is of critical imponance to the interpretation of those 
treaties, which are still in the majority, chat retain the list of extraditable offences. 
3. Conclusion 
It is necessary to strike the appropriate balance between safeguarding the rights 
of the individual and the strengthening of muruaUy beneficial internati.onal co-
operation in criminal matters between states. Clearly, in the absence of effective 
global international human rights enfarcement mechanisms, many of the tradi-
tional safeguards in the extradition process still have a vital role to play. In light 
of the above discussion. it is submitted that the double criminality rule based on 
dual conceptions of criminality of the conduct and a dual punishability require-
ment should be retained. However, the nationality exception should be abolished. 
In so doing international co-operation and individual human rights would be 
provided for. 
S3. Op. cir, Jupra n. 29. 
